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Frege on Referentiality and Julius Caesar
in Grundgesetze Section 10
Bruno Bentzen
Abstract This paper aims to answer the question of whether or not
Frege’s solution limited to value-ranges and truth-values proposed to
resolve the “problem of indeterminacy of reference” in section 10 of
Grundgesetze is a violation of his principle of complete determination,
which states that a predicate must be defined to apply for all objects in
general. Closely related to this doubt is the common allegation that
Frege was unable to solve a persistent version of the Caesar problem for
value-ranges. It is argued that, in Frege’s standards of reducing
arithmetic to logic, his solution to the indeterminacy does not give rise
to any sort of Caesar problem in the book.
1 The problem of the indeterminacy of reference
In section 10 of the first volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik,
Frege (1962) addresses a particular problem about the law he
formulated to introduce the notion of value-ranges, namely, the
famous Axiom V: the value-range of the function f is identical to
the value-range of the function g just in case f and g have the same
values for the same arguments.1 In symbols:
´f() = α´g(α)↔ (∀x)(f(x) = g(x)) (V)
1All English translations of the first and second volumes of Grundgesetze
(Frege, 1962) are taken from Furth (Frege, 1964) and Geach and Black (1960),
respectively. I shall, without comment, change Furth’s “course-of-values”
(Wertverlauf ) to “value-ranges” in order to unify terminology. Further references
to Grundgesetze will be in the text marked GGA followed by a Roman numeral
for the volume and a section number (whenever necessary).
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In short, the problem is that Axiom V fails to introduce a criterion
of identity for value-ranges that can account for all possible scenarios
so that it cannot fix the reference of value-range names even on the
intended interpretation—according to which “´f()” stands for the
value-range of the function f .2 This is the case because the law only
establishes the criteria for cases in which the value-range of some
function is identical to another object which is also explicitly given
as the value-range of another function (“´f() = α´g(α)”), that is, it
says nothing as to whether a mixed-identity statement is to be true or
false, and, by “mixed-identity statement”, I am referring to identities
between value-ranges and any other objects not necessarily given as
such (“´f() = q”). The fact that, in general, Axiom V is unable
to determine the truth-value of identity statements involving value-
ranges reveals an alarming semantic problem for Frege’s attempt
to successfully reduce arithmetic to logic: some sentences have no
truth-value at all.
Surprisingly, Frege’s solution for this “problem of indeterminacy
of reference” is to identify truth-values and value-ranges, which
provides him a way of determining mixed-identity statements
between the two kinds of logical objects of his formalism. This
solution, however, has raised serious doubts in the Fregean
literature3. First, its restriction to truth-values and value-ranges
does not seem to correspond with one of Frege’s fundamental
principles, namely, the “principle of complete determination”.
According to this principle, concepts must have sharp boundaries,
such that the definition of a predicate must say if it is true for all
objects. In other words, what one should expect of a complete
determination is that Frege actually determines whether, for
example, Julius Caesar is the value-range of a given function or
not. Of course, what holds for Caesar naturally holds for all other
objects. The second doubt is the usual complaint that its
restriction makes Frege’s solution unable to solve a “persistent
version”4 of what is known as the Caesar problem, an objection
2Kemp (2005) remarks that, later, in U¨ber die Grundlagen der Geometrie
I, Frege writes that “one can never expect principles or theorems to settle
the reference of a word or sign” (Frege, 1903, p. 275). Frege is certainly well
aware that it is not possible to determine the reference of value-range names
axiomatically either, since the permutation argument (see section 2) already
shows that the system will always have unintended models. Indeed, as we
shall discuss in sections 2–4, the real problem for Frege appears to be that the
indeterminacy of reference of value-range names implies that not all sentences of
the system are true or false.
3See e.g. Parsons (1965), Dummett (1981), Wright (1983), Moore and Rein
(1986), Ricketts (1997), Heck (1997b, 1999), Schirn (2001).
4I follow Ruffino’s (2002) terminology.
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about identity criteria for value-ranges. Since Frege apparently fails
to respond to those two objections, many scholars are now
convinced that neither the problem of the indeterminacy of
reference nor the Caesar problem were solved by Frege in GGA,
after all.
In this paper I will address these two questions. First, I argue
that in order to have an accurate understanding of the problem of
indeterminacy of reference and Frege’s restricted solution for it, one
should consider his “theory of referentiality”, which he explains
between the sections 29–31 of GGA. With this in mind, I hold that
the restriction of Frege’s solution to value-ranges and truth-values
is not a violation of the principle of complete determination, at
least in the form it takes in the system of GGA. Second, I hold that
the problem of indeterminacy of reference is merely a matter of
fixing the reference of the value-ranges names of the system,
whereas the Caesar problem—as previously stated by Ruffino
(2002)—is concerned with the question of establishing the nature of
numbers as logical objects. Thus, I claim that there is no analogy
between those two problems, as it is typically assumed in the
literature. However, before addressing those issues, I will provide a
brief review of Frege’s procedure for dealing with the problem of
the indeterminacy of reference in GGA §10. This will be the
objective of sections 2 and 3 of this paper. In section 4, I will
review Frege’s theory of referentiality discussed in GGA §§29–31 in
order to better understand his solution to the indeterminacy. In
section 5, I will offer an alternative view of the principle of
complete determination into the system of GGA that does not
allow any indeterminacy of the reference of value-range names. In
section 6, I will argue against what is commonly seen as a
persistent version of the Caesar problem in GGA.
2 The permutation argument
One might ask why we should take the problem of indeterminacy
of reference so seriously in the first place. The simple answer is
that many elements of Frege’s thought strongly suggest that one
should do so. First, the importance of this question is emphasized
by the fact Frege defines cardinal numbers as particular value-ranges
in GGA (§42) and, according to this, any referential indeterminacy
in the notion of value-ranges naturally amounts to an indeterminacy
of the same sort in the concept of cardinal number. Second, Frege is
usually celebrated as an Arch-Platonist, in the sense that he argues
that there are objective facts determining the truths of arithmetic.
Thus, numerals should mean something, and, so, refer to one and
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only one object.5 Third, since Frege regards sentences as names of
truth-values, a proof that every name has a unique reference becomes
not only a necessary step for a proof of consistency6 (a sentence that
refers to exactly one truth-value cannot be both true and false),
but, more than anything else, a means of expressing the principle of
bivalence that states that every sentence must be either true or false
(GGA, II, §56). It is important to mention that in order to fulfill
the principle of bivalence one does not need to determine exactly
which object is supposed to be the referent of a particular name,
since determining the truth-value of every sentence in which this
name occur is enough for that. As we shall see in the next section,
this is exactly what Frege does when he identifies truth-values and
value-ranges: he does not specify a unique reference for e.g. “´(−)”
(nor does he determine whether it denotes Julius Caesar or not),
rather, his primary concern is to make sure that every sentence of
the system where the name “´(−)” occurs has a determinate truth-
value.7 In this sense, the indeterminacy of reference of value-ranges
is unacceptable mainly because it shows that some sentences of the
system have no truth-value.
This being said, I shall now address, in the next section and the
remainder of this one, Frege’s procedure for facing the problem of
indeterminacy of reference. This problem is already established in
the initial paragraph of GGA §10, when Frege realizes that his
newly introduced axiom to govern the notion of value-ranges,
Axiom V (GGA, §3), does not determine the reference of all
sentences involving value-range names. The problem is put quite
clearly in Frege’s own words:
Although we have laid it down that the combination of
signs “´f() = α´g(α)” has the same denotation as
“(∀x)(f(x) = g(x))”, this by no means fixes completely
the denotation of a term like “´f()”. We have only a
means of always recognizing a value-range if it is
designated by a term like “´f()”, by which it is already
recognizable as a value-range. But we can neither
decide, so far, whether an object is a value-range that is
not given us as such, and to what a function it may
correspond, nor decide in general whether a given
value-range has a given property unless we know that
this property is connected with a property of the
corresponding function. (GGA, §10)
5Cf. Grundlagen der Arithmetik, §§57–61.
6See Sluga (1980, p. 167).
7I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me.
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That is, Axiom V is insufficient to determine the reference (truth-
value) of sentences of the form “´f() = q”, which amounts to the
indeterminacy of the reference of value-range names, since it does not
provide us with a general means of recognizing a value-range as the
same again when it is not given by the description “the value-range
of ...”.8
In order to confirm his informal remarks, Frege articulates a
technical argument to confirm the indeterminacy. This so-called
“permutation argument”9 goes as follows:
(i) Let ∆ be an assignment of objects to value-range names in
such a way that it satisfies Axiom V;10
(ii) Let h be a nontrivial permutation of all objects in the domain of
first-order variables, so that for some value-range a, h(a) 6= a;11
(iii) Now consider a new assignment ∆′ which is related to ∆ as
follows: if ∆ assigns an object x to a value-range name, ∆′ will
assign h(x) to it;
(iv) Since h is a nontrivial permutation, it follows that at least one
value-range name can have either x or h(x) as its reference,
without the identity x = h(x) assured.
In other words, the permutation argument shows that if there is an
interpretation that satisfies Axiom V, then, by permutation, there
will be others, so that the reference of the value-range names is not
uniquely determined by Axiom V.
8Surprisingly, not all cases of indeterminacy are strictly of the form “´f() =
q”. Recall that Frege allowed value-range names for functional expressions of
one argument (“´f()”) and two arguments (“α´´g(, α)”). Now suppose that
Frege wanted to determine the truth-value of “´f() = α´´g(, α)”. By Axiom V,
this sentence is co-referential (gleichbedeutend) with “(∀x)(f(x) = ´g(, x))”.
However, we know that Axiom V cannot fix its reference if f(a) is a truth-value
for some a. In sum, Axiom V might even fail to fix the reference of nonmixed-
identity statements such as “´f() = α´´g(, α)”—I am indebted to Alessandro
Duarte for reminding me of this point. Thus, it is perhaps more accurate to state
that Axiom V is unable to decide the truth-value of sentences which are of the
form “´f() = q” up to sameness of reference (Bedeutungsgleichheit).
9Dummett (1981, p. 408).
10I assume here, for the sake of argument, that Axiom V is consistent.
11It is uncontroversial in the literature whether this permutation should be
expressible in the formal language of GGA or not. Dummett (1981) claims that
it does not. Moore and Rein (1986, p. 378) argue that it does, pointing out that
this perhaps explains Frege’s additional remark “at least if there does exist such
a function...” (GGA, §10).
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3 The identification of value-ranges and truth-values
According to Frege, it is possible to solve the indeterminacy simply
by “its being determined for every function when it is introduced,
what values it takes on for value-ranges as arguments, just as for all
other arguments” (GGA, §10). As a result, he limits himself to the
only three functions introduced in his formalism up to this point:
(i) “−x” (the horizontal): the function whose value is the True
for the True as argument and the False otherwise;
(ii) “¬x” (negation): the function whose value is the True for the
False as argument and the False otherwise;
(iii) “x = y” (identity): the function whose value is the True if x
refers to the same object as y and the False otherwise.
Next, Frege observes that if it is determined what values identity
has for value-ranges as arguments, the horizontal and negation will
be determined as well. This holds for two reasons: (i) since the
value of the function “x = x” is the True for all arguments, the
horizontal can be expressed through identity as the function “x =
(x = x)”; (ii) since we can understand “¬∆” as the negation of
“−∆” (i.e. “¬(−∆)”), negation can be seen as a function applied to
the horizontal. Hence Frege’s claim that to determine what values
identity has for value-ranges as arguments is the same as determining
them for the horizontal and negation.
However, it is worth mentioning that Frege’s starting point was
the very problem that Axiom V was insufficient to determine the
truth-value of sentences of the form “´f() = q”, so we are incurring
circularity by trying to solve it by determining what values identity
has for value-ranges as arguments. Frege’s way out of this impasse
is pointed out by the very permutation argument: recall that it
shows that Axiom V is incapable of determining a unique reference
to an arbitrary value-range name “´f()”, so it does not rule out the
possibility of the referent of “´f()” being any object in the domain,
including truth-values. To put it another way, this shows that it is
consistent with Axiom V for value-ranges to be truth-values:
(i) Let ∆ be an assignment of objects to value-range names in
such a way that it satisfies Axiom V;
(ii) Let f and g be two noncoextensional functions and a and b be
the objects denoted by “´f()” and “´g()”, respectively;
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(iii) Let h be the following nontrivial permutation of all objects in
the domain of first-order variables:
h(x) =

True if x = a
a if x = True
False if x = b
b if x = False
x otherwise
(iv) Now consider a new assignment ∆′ which is related to ∆ as
follows: if ∆ assigns an object x to a value-range name, ∆′ will
assign h(x) to it instead;
(v) It follows without contradicting Axiom V that it is possible
to identify the value-ranges of two arbitrary noncoextensional
functions f and g with the True and the False.12
(Note that f and g must be noncoextensional, otherwise (v) would
contradict the premise that the True and the False are different ob-
jects.)
Frege then feels free to stipulate that some value-ranges are
truth-values. Unsurprisingly, he chooses the function “same as the
True”, the horizontal, to play the role of f and defines a function
“same as the False”, “y = (∀x)(¬(x = x))”, to play the role of g,
stipulating: (T) “´(−)” denotes the True and (F)
“´( = (∀x)(¬(x = x)))” denotes the False. And now, with (T) and
(F) as supplements to Axiom V, it is possible to determine the
truth-value of mixed-identity statements between value-ranges and
truth-values, so that Frege believes to have determined the
reference of the value-range names as far as it is possible at this
point of the construction of the system (whenever we introduce new
functions that are not reducible to the old ones the same problem
appears again).
4 Frege’s criteria of referentiality
Before proceeding any further, I would like to examine Frege’s
claim that in order to solve the indeterminacy, it suffices to
12This stipulation is sometimes called the “trans-sortal identification”
(Dummett, 1991) or “identifiability thesis” (Schroeder-Heister, 1987) in the
literature. Its acceptance among Fregean scholars, however, is not univocal.
Schroeder-Heister (1987) argues against its arbitrariness saying that that the
permutation argument provides no justification for the identification. For a reply
to Schroeder-Heister’s criticism, see Moore and Rein (1987), especially p. 52.
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determine for each function what values it has for value-ranges as
arguments. It is by no means obvious why we should overcome the
indeterminacy this way, which has led to some debates in the
Fregean literature. As far as I am aware, the most accepted views
are Dummett’s suggestion of the procedure as a generalized version
of Frege’s context principle, that is, the principle that states that
only in the context of a sentence does a name have a reference, and
Ruffino’s reading of the procedure as an application of Leibniz’s
principle, namely, the famous logical principle that two objects are
identical if and only if every function has the same value for both
objects as arguments.13 However, I do not share either of these
views. What both Dummett and Ruffino have to take into account
is that Frege’s procedure is deeply connected with the “criteria of
referentiality” that he discusses in sections 29–31 of GGA.14 This is
where he attempts to provide a proof that every value-range name
is referential (that is, that it has a reference). And, taking Frege’s
actual account of referentiality, it is possible to understand that his
procedure in GGA §10 is just an application of a formalized version
of the principle of complete determination, that is, the principle
that says that for a predicate to be adequately defined in science, it
should be determined under which circumstances it is true or not of
all objects15. I shall further develop this view in the remainder of
this section and the following section.
Frege’s proof that every value-range name has a reference is
ultimately found in his famous “proof of referentiality”—a
demonstration that all the names of the formalism are referential.
The proof itself is carried out in GGA §31, but its fundaments are
presented earlier in the text. For instance, since only well-formed
names can be ascribed a reference, section 30 explains the
formation rules of Frege’s formalism, where a key element of the
proof will be the fact that there are only names for value-ranges
and truth-values in the formalism, that is, there are not names for
urelements—objects (concrete or abstract) that are not sets
(value-ranges). There are some other interesting details about
Frege’s method of forming names,16 but I think I have given
13Cf. Dummett (1981, p. 408) and Ruffino (2002, pp. 128–130).
14Since Frege’s theory of referentiality is presented in §§29–31, offering a
justification for Frege’s strategy of determining the reference of value-range
names in §10 without taking §§29–31 into account (as Dummett and Ruffino
seem to do) is to erroneously regard §10 as if it were a section that is isolated
and disconnected from the rest of GGA (see Heck (1999, p. 258)). In fact, as
discussed at the end of this section, nothing but Frege’s theory of referentiality
is needed to justify his strategy in §10.
15See GGA II, §57.
16Cf. Bentzen (2014, p. 61).
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enough information here to enable me to present the proof I would
like to discuss.
The idea behind Frege’s proof of referentiality is that (i) the
primitive names of the system are referential and (ii) the
referentiality of names composed by primitive names follows by
induction. What I want to examine in detail is the way Frege
elaborates the steps of his proof. For the sake of clarity, I will
discuss the latter first.
(ii) Frege begins the argument for his proof in section 29, where he
articulates its inductive step by establishing for each syntactic type
of name in his formalism what I call a “criterion of referentiality”,
which is a particular requirement for ascribing proper names and
functional expressions a reference:
(a) A first-level functional expression of one argument “f(x)” is
referential if the proper name “f(∆)” that results from the
application of “f(x)” to “∆” always has a reference for any
referential proper name “∆”;
(b) A proper name “∆” is referential if (i) the proper name “f(∆)”
that results from “f(x)”, when its argument-places are filled
by “∆”, always has a reference for any referential first-level
functional expression of one argument “f(x)”; (ii) the first-level
functional expression of one argument “f(∆, y)” that results
from “f(x, y)”, when its x-argument-places are filled by “∆”,
always has a reference for any referential first-level functional
expression of two arguments “f(x, y)”, and if the same holds
for its y-argument-places as well;
(c) A first-level functional expression of two arguments “f(x, y)”
is referential if the proper name “f(∆,Γ)” that results from
“f(x, y)”, when its x- and y-argument-places are respectively
filled by “∆” and “Γ”, always has a reference for any referential
proper names “∆” and “Γ”.
Note that Frege’s criteria simply state that a name is referential
if and only if it yields new referential names when it takes other
referential names in the name formation.
(i) Whereas Frege’s goal in section 31 is to show that all primitive
names of his formalism are referential, it is enough to limit myself
to his account of quantifiers and, of course, value-range names here.
One might ask what, in principle, quantifiers have to do with the
indeterminacy of value-range names. To answer this question, take,
for instance, the following sentence definable in GGA’s formalism:
(∃x)(∀F )(¬(x = ´F ())) (1)
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Note that it essentially says that “there is at least one object that
is not a value-range of a function”. Is this sentence true or false?
Since the domain of GGA is usually believed to be all-inclusive,
such that first-order variables should range over all possible
objects, it seems plausible to claim that this sentence should be
true: after all, there are several counterexamples of objects in the
all-inclusive universe that are not value-ranges—people, trees,
planets (i.e. urelements).17 Indeed, it is worth mentioning that
there is some evidence suggesting that Frege did attempt to do
something like identifying urelements with value-ranges. This issue
is discussed in a famous footnote to section 10, a passage that drew
the attention of several commentators due to its connection to
Frege’s commitment to the principle of complete determination.
The reason for this is that this footnote is the place where Frege
attempts to generalize his restricted solution for the indeterminacy
(from truth-values and value-ranges) to all possible objects in
general. Recall that Frege’s solution to the indeterminacy was to
stipulate (T) and (F), which consists of identifying the True with
the value-range of the function “same as the True” and the False
with the value-range of the function “same as the False”. Now, a
natural generalization of it would be to identify every object a with
the value-range of the function “identical to a”, that is, to
stipulate:
∆ = ´( = ∆) (G)
which basically means to identify every object with the value-range of
a property only satisfied by itself and no other object, a procedure
similar to identifying an object with its singleton. However, this
proposal was rejected, for in the case where ∆ is already known to
be a value-range of some function f , we would have the following
instance
α´f(α) = ´( = α´f(α)) (2)
which, by Axiom V, has the same truth-value as
(∀x)(f(x) = (x = α´f(α))) (3)
which is false when f maps an argument other than α´f(α) itself to
the True.
The point to be made here, however, is: why did Frege attempt
to provide a general solution to the problem of indeterminacy in the
first place? Didn’t he claim his restricted solution was enough to fix
17See Dummett (1981), Heck (1999), Schirn (2001), among others. In fact, in
no part of GGA Frege is clear about what objects his first-order variables are
supposed to range over.
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the reference of value-range names (as far as this is possible)? The
fact that Frege’s general solution failed to solve the indeterminacy
served as the root of the suspicions about the legitimacy of Frege’s
restricted solution in the Fregean literature. For the time being, I
shall return to the analysis of (1), leaving discussion of criticisms of
Frege’s restricted solution for sections 5 and 6.
I have exposed enough reasons to claim that (1) is true. And, in
fact, this is the view of several influential commentators in the
Fregean literature.18 However, an ultimate answer for this issue
should also rely on Frege’s interpretation of quantifiers. At first
glance it may seem that Frege subscribes to a substitutional
interpretation of quantifiers in GGA (Resnik, 1986; Dummett,
1991; Hintikka and Sandu, 2005), that is, the view that a quantified
sentence is true if and only if all of its substitution instances are
true:
To investigate whether the name “(∀x)(φ(x))” of a
second-level function denotes something, we ask
whether it follows universally from the fact that the
function-name “f(x)” denotes something, that
“(∀x)(f(x))” succeeds in denoting. Now “f(x)” has a
denotation if, for every denoting proper name “∆”,
“f(∆)” denotes something. If this is the case, then this
denotation either always is the True (whatever “∆”
denotes), or not always. In the first case “(∀x)(f(x))”
denotes the True, in the second the False. Thus it
follows universally from the fact that the substituted
function-name “f(x)” denotes something, that
“(∀x)(f(x))” denotes something. Consequently the
function name “(∀x)(φ(x))” is to be admitted into the
sphere of denoting names. (GGA, §31)
However, this is very unclear, since Frege appears to vacillate
between the substitutional and objectual interpretation in
GGA (Martin Jr , 1982). In fact, over the last few years, Linnebo
(2004) has offered strong arguments that Frege’s strategy
in §§29–31 is neither compatible with a substitutional nor objectual
interpretation of quantifiers. Linnebo proposes instead a reading of
Frege’s view on quantifiers based on Heck’s “auxiliary
names” (Heck, 1997b), a special category of names corresponding
to Frege’s uppercase Greek letters that essentially serves the same
purpose as assignments of values to free variables do in modern
18See e.g. Dummett (1981, ch. 15), Heck (1999, pp. 272–273), Schirn (2001,
pp. 45–46).
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logic. Under this view, it follows that (1) is true iff the domain of
GGA is not limited to truth-values and value-ranges as objects.
More importantly, this interpretation raises the question of whether
Frege’s referentiality criteria should also be interpreted in terms of
auxiliary names or not. As Linnebo (2004) points out, the former
view will say that a candidate name is referential just in case all
names which are formed by combining the candidate name with a
referential name of the correct syntactic category (whether this
name is part of the language or not) are referential; the latter view,
the nonauxiliary one, will say that a candidate name is referential
just in case it forms referential names when correctly combined
with names already recognized as referential. Following Linnebo, I
shall favor the latter view, which has been supported by powerful
arguments.19
With that said, I can now return to Frege’s proof. In the case
of value-range names, Frege’s proof must be more involved because
until the introduction of value-range names all the previous existing
names of GGA are sentence names (names of truth-values), which
means that he is introducing names which stand for a new category
of objects, namely, value-ranges. Now, since value-range names fall
into the category of proper names, one must apply the criterion (b)
stated in 4.(ii) for proper names in general. Under the nonauxiliary
reading, (b) can be reformulated as follows:
(b∗) Let “f(x)” be a functional expression already recognized as
referential. A value-range name “´f()” is referential if (i) the
proper name “g(´f())” that results from “g(x)”, when its
argument-places are filled by “´f()”, always has a reference
for any first-level functional expression of one argument
“g(x)” already recognized as referential; (ii) the first-level
functional expression of one argument “g(´f(), x)” that
results from the filling of the x-argument-places of “g(x, y)”
with “´f()” always has a reference for any first-level
functional expression of two arguments “g(x, y)” already
recognized as referential, and if the same holds for its
y-argument-places as well.
In short, Frege’s criterion of referentiality states that in order to
determine if a proper value-range name (value-range names formed
from functional expressions already recognized as referential) is
referential, it suffices to determine for each first-level functional
expression g already recognized as referential what values it has for
19See Linnebo (2004, §§4–6).
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this value-range as argument. However, we should recall the
following quotation from the section 10:
How may this indefiniteness be overcome? By its being
determined for every function when it is introduced, what
values it takes on for value-ranges as arguments, just as
for all other arguments. (GGA, §10)
A careful examination shows that this is the very strategy Frege
designed earlier in GGA §10 as a way out of the indeterminacy of
the value-ranges. That is, there is no reference to any generalized
context principle, and no Leibniz principle is invoked in this passage.
In fact, this interpretation is confirmed once again in the closing
passage of GGA §10:
With this we have determined the value-ranges so far as
is here possible. As soon as there is a further question of
introducing a function that is not completely reducible
to functions known already, we can stipulate what value
it is to have for value-ranges as arguments; and this can
then be regarded as much as a further determination of
the value-ranges as of that function.
In sum, nothing but Frege’s own account of the referentiality is used
to explain his suggestion to solve the indeterminacy by determining
for every function what values it has for value-ranges as arguments
in section 10.
So how Frege’s referentiality proof for value-range names is
carried out? His argument begins by showing that when proper
value-ranges are placed in the (a) x-argument places of the
functional expressions of one argument “−x” and “¬x” they yield a
referential proper name; (b) x-argument or y-argument places in
the functional expressions of two arguments “x = y” and
“(−x) → (−y)” (the conditional) they yield a referential functional
expression of one argument. He then remarks that “(−x) → (−y)”
is referential only if the names “−x” and “−y” are referential.
Now, since we already know that the horizontal and negation are
reducible to identity, it turns out that a (proper) value-range name
“´f()” is referential if and only if both “´f() = y” and
“x = ´f()” are referential functional expressions of one argument.
And, with this, he attempts to justify his solution in GGA §10:
By our stipulations, that “´f() = α´g(α)” is always to
have the same denotation as “(∀x)(f(x) = g(x))”, that
“´(−)” is to denote the True, and that
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“´( = (∀x)(¬(x = x))” is to denote the False, a
denotation is assured in every case for a proper name of
the form “Γ = ∆”, if “Γ” and “∆” are proper
value-range names or names of truth-values. (GGA,
§31)
Accordingly, it seems reasonable for Frege to claim to have fixed
the reference of value-range names in GGA, once identity—the only
remaining case of indeterminacy—is completely determined with the
Axiom V supplemented by the restricted stipulation. If there are any
questions that should be raised about his procedure, they should be
certainly concerning quantified sentences, or more accurately, the
denotation of auxiliary names. For if ∆ is an auxiliary name in
“´f() = ∆”, the latter is a referential functional expression only
if ∆ denotes a truth-value or value-range. But, being an auxiliary
name, ∆ is only subject to the condition that it should denote some
object in the domain.20
5 The principle of complete determination
In the previous section, I raised some questions regarding Frege’s
commitment to the principle of complete determination in GGA.
Shouldn’t the fact that Frege’s view on the referentiality of value-
range names does not take into account urelements as objects be
20 This fact has led some scholars such as Heck (1999) and Ruffino (2002)
to question whether Frege wasn’t operating in a domain restricted to value-
ranges and truth-values after all. Heck (1999, p. 272) considers this possibility,
but quickly argues against it, under the allegation that Frege sharply criticizes
other logicians who talk of restricted domains—Heck is referring here to Frege’s
objection in GGA II §65, which, as he admits, is the only passage he found in
which Frege speaks directly against this possibility (cf. Heck (1999, fn. 25)).
In section 5, I shall offer a novel interpretation of Frege’s objection that is not
inconsistent with this restriction of the domain. Ruffino remarks that, when
discussing the range of objects of his theory, Frege writes that “I count as
objects everything that is not a function, for example, numbers, truth-values,
and the value-ranges” (GGA, §2), all of which are fundamentally value-ranges.
Nevertheless, Ruffino (2002, pp. 137–138) is aware that this is far from being
a decisive piece of textual evidence to support his claim. In any case, it
appears that there is no option but to suppose that an earnest thinker such
as Frege wouldn’t consider other objects such as urelements without explicitly
saying so—especially in such a critical section such as GGA §31. Indeed, if one
refrains from committing to this view that the domain of the system of GGA is
restricted to value-ranges and truth-values, the only alternative left that seems
to explain Frege’s lack of concern about urelements is to admit a nonauxiliary
interpretation of his quantifiers. However, as I mentioned before, this reading
is very problematic. Fortunately, this speculative discussion about the domain
of GGA will not be relevant to my main arguments in this paper and, for this
reason, I shall not address this issue here.
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seen as an explicit violation of principle of complete determination
in GGA?21 For instance, in the following passage of GGA II, Frege
explicitly criticizes a similar account of referentiality restricted to
numbers as objects:
But can we not stipulate that the expression ‘the sum of
one object and another object’ is to have a reference only
when both objects are numbers? In that case, you may
well think, the concept something that gives the result
one when added to itself is one with sharp boundaries;
for now we know that no object that is not a number
falls under it. E.g. the Moon does not fall under it, since
the sum of the Moon and the Moon is not one. This is
wrong. On the present view, the sentence ‘the sum of the
Moon and the Moon is one’ is neither true nor false; for
in either case the words ‘the sum of the Moon and the
Moon’ would have to stand for something, and this was
expressly denied by the suggested stipulation. (GGA,
II, §64)
Indeed, Frege’s objection seems to imply that it is a mistake to think
that the concept “something that is a value-range of some function”
has sharp boundaries in GGA, because its corresponding functional
expression
(∃F )(x = ´F ()) (4)
only has a reference for value-ranges and truth-values as objects;
that is, (4) has no reference at all for urelements as objects, meaning
that no complete determination in this sense takes place in GGA.22
What’s more, there is no doubt that Frege believed that his proof in
GGA §31 indeed suffices to guarantee a reference for each value-range
name, which confirms that, according to him, the reference of value-
range names is completely determined by his restricted account.23
Is it possible that Frege simply abandoned the principle of
complete determination during some part of the book? This seems
highly unlikely. Frege is well-known for his wish to establish
arithmetic in a solid basis as an exact science, and, according to
21See, for instance, Heck (1999).
22This is substantially the position of many Fregean commentators such as
Parsons (1965), Dummett (1981), Wright (1983), Ricketts (1997), Heck (1997b,
1999, 2005), Schirn (2001).
23At least until his acknowledgment of Russell’s paradox, “It seems, then, [...]
that my explanations in §31 are not sufficient to ensure that my combinations of
signs have a meaning in all cases.” (Frege, 1967a)
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him, only the principle of complete determination can settle the
guidelines of the proper scientific use of a name or predicate:
So long as it is not completely defined, or known in some
other way, what word or symbol stands for, it may not
be used in an exact science [...] (GGA, II, §57)
More importantly, Greimann (2003) recently pointed out an
interesting passage in Frege’s writings where he states explicitly the
role of the criteria of referentiality in GGA and its relation with the
principle of complete determination:
Here again we likewise see that the laws of logic
presuppose concepts with sharp boundaries, and
therefore also complete definitions for names of
functions, like the plus sign. In vol. I we expressed this
as follows: every function-name must have a reference.
Accordingly all conditional definitions, and any
procedure of piecemeal definition, must be rejected.
Every symbol must be completely denied at a stroke, so
that, as we say, it acquires a reference. (GGA, II, §65)
With this in mind, it is natural to take the criteria of referentiality
as the formal incorporation of the principle of complete
determination in the system of GGA, and the proof of referentiality
as the demonstration that all predicates and proper names of the
system can be properly used in science, which basically means that
the references of all names in the formalism are completely
determinate.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, under the nonauxiliary
reading, Frege’s criteria of referentiality do not imply that, say,
“f(x)” is referential if, for every object a, it follows that “f(a)”
denotes something.24 Instead, they suggest that “f(x)” is
referential if, for every meaningful name ∆ expressible in the formal
language of the system, it follows that “f(∆)” denotes something.
Therefore, it appears that the principle is represented linguistically
in GGA.25
Besides, because there are no names for urelements, it seems
somehow acceptable for Frege that, in the system of GGA, the
principle of complete determination neglects urelements and applies
only to value-ranges and truth-values, the objects on which he
intends to construct his arithmetic. But if this is the case, what
24For an auxiliary name ‘a’ denoting a.
25A similar conclusion is drawn by Greimann (2003, pp. 273–275).
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would be Frege’s motivation to generalize his stipulation in the
footnote to section 10? There is nothing wrong with this, if it is for
mere convenience, that is, to generally solve any indeterminacy
that would arise from adding new names to the language. As
well-known, Frege thinks of his formalism as a lingua
characteristica in the Leibnizian sense. Therefore, his symbolic
notation for concepts should be suitable not only for arithmetic,
but, in principle, for discussing any other domain, such as geometry
or physics, as he suggests in the preface of Begriffsschrift (Frege,
1879).26
So Frege subscribed to a principle of complete determination
limited to value-ranges and truth-values in GGA. That said, what
could be the point of his objection in GGA II §64? In the following
section of GGA II, Frege raises another similar objection, which, as
he says, attempts to “throw light on the matter from other
sides.” (GGA, II, §65)
If anybody wants to exclude from consideration all
objects that are not numbers, he must first say what he
takes ‘number’ to mean, and then further extension of
this term is inadmissible. Such a restriction would have
to be incorporated in the definition, which would thus
take some such form as: ‘If a and b are numbers, then
a + b stands for ...’ We should have a conditional
definition. [...] By a well-known law of logic, the
proposition ‘if a is a number and b is a number then
a+ b = b+ a’ can be transformed into the proposition ‘if
a + b is not equal to b + a and a is a number, then b is
not a number’ and here it is impossible to maintain the
restriction to the domain of numbers. (GGA, II, §65)
Frege’s principle of complete determination, in the system of
GGA, applies to only value-ranges and truth-values (henceforth
26This brings the question of how the nonlogical axioms of a scientific theory
with urelements may be accommodated in the system of GGA. Because scientific
theories often favor the use of urelements, the system of GGA could not be
straightforwardly used as the logical part of an axiomatized scientific theory.
I suspect that, after the failure of his proposal in the footnote to section 10,
Frege was well-aware of this fact. But I do not believe this prevents the
usage of the system of GGA as a lingua characteristica. Suppose that Frege
wanted to augment the language of GGA with names for point particles and the
conventional postulates of classical mechanics, for example. In order to guarantee
that the resulting theory could be properly used as a scientific theory, Frege could
try to expand his proof of GGA §§29–31 with additional stipulations such that
(i) none of the point particles names refer to a value-range and (ii) every sentence
name corresponding to a nonlogical axiom refers to the True.
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referred to as logical objects). While every number is a value-range
of some particular function (GGA, §42), certainly not all
value-ranges are numbers. From this viewpoint, Frege’s objections
are indeed coherent with his referentiality criteria: one is not
allowed to think that concepts such as “something such that the
sum of it and itself equals 1” have sharp boundaries if they are only
“completely” determined for numbers as objects, because many
other logical objects are left out of account. For instance, the
sentence “the sum of the True and the True equals 1” would lack a
reference, and the same holds for most value-ranges as well.
In sum, we can conclude that, according to Frege, one simply
cannot neglect logical objects when completely determining a
concept in the system of GGA, unlike urelements, which may
always be left out of account without any problems.27 To put it
another way, logical objects seem to have a privileged role in GGA,
which comes as no surprise, considering Frege’s conviction that no
other objects are needed in a logicist foundation of arithmetic.
6 The Caesar problem
Finally, I would like to make two points about what seems to be
the last objection going against my suggestion that it seems
acceptable for Frege to apply the principle of complete
determination only to logical objects in GGA. What is widely
known as the “Caesar problem” in the Fregean literature is the
most decisive piece of textual evidence in Frege’s writings
supporting the relevance of urelements in the determination of the
reference of a name or predicate for the proper use in science. The
Caesar problem takes place in Frege’s earlier book, Grundlagen der
Arithmetik (GLA), an investigation about the logical nature of the
concept of number. In fact, before his actual definition of
individual numbers as value-ranges in GGA, Frege’s most
prominent attempt was to introduce the concept of cardinal
number via the following identity criterion (Hume’s Principle): the
27A similar conclusion is drawn by Moore and Rein (1986), who claim that
Frege restricted his attention to logical objects because “he was concerned
only with questions that could be stated within his formalism”; besides, since
the language of GGA “contained proper names only for value-ranges and the
two truth-values, questions involving other objects (if there are such objects)
cannot be formulated within the system.” (Moore and Rein, 1986, p. 384, fn. 9).
Unfortunately, a problem with Moore and Rein’s view is that it cannot explain
why Frege chose to do so and deliberately left urelements out of account. I show
how this restriction is compatible with my interpretation in section 6. What’s
more, Moore and Rein’s account lack a justification for Frege’s objections in
GGA II §§64–65, which I see as another benefit of my interpretation.
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number of F s is the same as the number of Gs just in case F and G
are in a one-to-one correspondence. In symbols:
NxFx = NxGx↔ F1− 1G (HP)
The reason why Frege did not carry on this definition to GGA is due
to the Caesar problem, a problem of indeterminacy concerning the
concept of number, namely, the objection that (HP) fails in deciding
whether, say, Julius Caesar is identical to the number of moons of
Jupiter:
In the proposition [the number of F s is identical with
the number of Gs] the [number of F s] plays the part of
an object, and our definition affords us a means of
recognizing this object as the same again, in case it
should happen to crop up in some other guise, say as
[the number of Gs]. But this means does not provide for
all cases. It will not, for instance, decide for us whether
[Julius Caesar] is the same as [the number of moons of
Jupiter]—if I may be forgiven an example which looks
nonsensical. Naturally no one is going to confuse [Julius
Caesar] with [the number of moons of Jupiter]; but this
is no thanks to our definition of [number].28 (Frege,
1884, §66)
Although Frege’s inept words look quite nonsensical at first glance,
the usual consensus in the Fregean scholarship is that his objection
reveals a deep concern about four inter-related dimensions of funda-
mental problems:29
(i) The epistemic problem: (HP) does not afford us a means of
recognizing numbers as the same again if they are not given
as number names. It is now well known that (HP) together
with second-order logic is able to prove Peano’s postulates—a
result called Frege’s Theorem.30 However, the resulting
28This passage is transposed from the context of Frege’s original discussion
about an analogous principle governing the notion of directions (although
certainly not a similar principle in the sense that directions are not supposed
to be logical objects).
29As far as I am aware, Heck (1997a) was the first to notice that the
Caesar problem poses both an epistemic and a semantic objection. Later,
Greimann (2003) reinforced Heck’s view and added to it ontological and logical
dimensions. More recently, MacBride (2006) distinguished ontological, epistemic
and semantic aspects of the problem, as well, but he seems to have overlooked
its logical dimension.
30Cf. Wright (1983), Boolos (1987).
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arithmetic, also known as Frege’s arithmetic, cannot truly
represent the way we apprehend numbers as objects, once
(HP) can’t explain our common understanding of numbers.
We certainly know that objects such as the Moon or Julius
Caesar are not numbers and an adequate definition should
provide identity criteria for numbers that settle the falsity of
such expected identity statements.
(ii) The ontological problem: (HP) does not inform us what kind
of entity numbers really are. The classic example is Zermelo’s
and von Neumann’s definitions of number. The former defined
0 to be the empty set and defined the successor function as a
mapping from x to the singleton of x, resulting in a progression
like ∅, {∅}, {{∅}} ... The latter defined 0 as the empty set as
well, but defined the successor function as a mapping from x to
the union of x and the singleton of x, forming the progression
∅, {∅}, {{∅}, {{∅}}} ... As a result, one has that, for example,
“the number of vertices of a triangle = the number of inner
angles of a triangle” holds, but from this it does not follow
which particular object is the number 3.
(iii) The logical problem: (HP) does not establish a sharp
distinction of the boundaries of the concept of number. (HP)
does not introduce properly the predicate “x is a number”,
since it does not determine completely, for every object,
whether this predicate must be applied to it. This objection
is closely related to the principle of complete determination,
and one can find here some similarity with the core problem
discussed in section 5 for value-ranges.
(iv) The semantic problem: (HP) does not fix the reference of
sentences containing number names. Frege’s doctrine of sense
and reference establishes that all sentences must have a
truth-value. More precisely, the problem is seen as the
technical difficulty that (HP) cannot determine whether the
reference of “NxFx = q” is to be the True or the False,
therefore not determining the referent of “NxFx”.
Moreover, it can be seen that the epistemic, ontological, and logical
problems can be all reduced to the semantic dimension, in the sense
that the latter is the most basic of the four objections: (i) When
faced with the question of how numbers are given to us in
GLA §62, Frege invokes the context principle, and the investigation
takes the form of asking how we can fix the reference of sentences
containing number names. First noted by Dummett (1993), this
passage is now often regarded as the one that led to the linguistic
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turn in philosophy. (ii) Given Frege’s context principle, the matter
of establishing which kind of entity numbers are amounts to the
task of fixing the reference of number names. (iii) For Frege, once
the principle of complete determination settles the guidelines for
ascribing a predicate a unique and determinate reference, the
logical problem is reduced to the semantic problem, as well.
That said, the first point I would like to make is how Frege’s
Caesar objection for numbers in GLA seems to anticipate the
problem of indeterminacy of reference for value-ranges in the initial
paragraph of GGA §10, as, structurally, both objections are raised
in the same way. The usual argument for this goes as follows.31
Note that both Axiom V and (HP) are all instances of the same
scheme, what is today known as an abstraction principle32
f(a) = f(b)↔ a ∼ b (AP)
where ∼ is a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive (i.e. equivalence)
relation. Now, it is easy to see that any instance of (AP) is unable
to determine whether “f(a) = q” is true or false: one has not
enough information to verify if its corresponding equivalence
relation holds or not. Therefore, one should see undetermined
identity statements which are left by both Axiom V and (HP) as a
consequence of a limitation of the very technique of abstraction
itself. This is supposed to show not only a close parallel between
the problem of indeterminacy of reference and the Caesar problem,
but that, in principle, exchanging (HP) for Axiom V would only
“solve” the problem by passing it on from numbers to value-ranges.
But—and this is a crucial point—this is exactly what Frege seems
to do to solve the Caesar problem in GLA: facing this obstacle with
(HP), he simply explicitly defines the operator “the number of F s”
as the “extension of the concept in one-one correspondence with
F”, and adds to it a footnote “I assume that it is known what the
extension of a concept is” (Frege, 1884, §68). Ultimately, extensions
are generalized to the notion of a value-range later in GGA, so that
the problem of indeterminacy of reference can be seen as a
consequence of his “unfinished business” of GLA and interpreted as
a persistent version of the Caesar problem that recurs in GGA for
value-ranges. Note that all of this confirms the Caesar problem as a
semantic one, characterizing what I would like to call the “strong
view” of the Caesar problem, a quite prominent view in the
Fregean literature since initially suggested by Parsons (1965), and
31See e.g. Kemp (2005, p. 183), and Heck (2005, p. 163).
32Here I ignore the fact that (HP) is a second-order principle.
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subsequently argued by both Dummett (1981) and Wright (1983)
several years later.
The second point I would like to stress is the reason I think this
strong view is incorrect. The reason I call it a “strong view” is
because, when taken literally, that is, as the objection that a
definition must decide identity statements between the definiendum
and all possible objects, the Caesar problem is too strong. In
everyday mathematics, such as in the definition of a topological
space, we do not worry about whether Julius Caesar is an open set
or not.33 The reason we do not care about this is that urelements
play no role in conventional mathematics. The universe of set
theory—at least in the Zermelo-Fraenkel theory with the axiom of
choice (ZFC), usually considered the standard foundational theory
of mathematics—is constructed out of sets alone. However,
according to the strong view, Frege’s objection in this passage
suggests that a foundational theory should take urelements in
account, at least to assure that the predicates it defines have a
precise scientific meaning. This is clearly in contrast with my
considerations about Frege’s acceptance of the principle of
complete determination being restricted to logical objects. But not
only this: the strong view poses such a severe objection that even
all of Frege’s very procedures regarding identities in GGA §]10 and
§§29–31 are unable to overcome. That is, recall that Frege did not
decide in the theory of GGA whether an arbitrary urelement is a
value-range or not—and I believe this should be thought as
signaling that something must be wrong with the strong
interpretation rather than with Frege’s very procedures, a frequent
claim in the literature.34
Therefore, instead of mitigating the shortcomings of the strong
view, I would like to consider an alternative interpretation of the
Caesar problem due to Ruffino (2002) that has proved faithful to
Frege’s procedures regarding identities in GGA, while confirming
33In fact, questions such as this one are pointless or even meaningless for the
working mathematician. As Kemp (2005) remarks, “If only in the context of a
sentence has a word really a meaning, then why is it not the case that only in the
context of a theory or language has a sentence really a meaning?” On the other
hand, it appears that such kind of question should be answered negatively, since
people and sets are completely different categories of objects. For an account
of reference and objecthood that is faithful to both kind of intuitions regarding
cross-category identities, see Linnebo (2005).
34Cf. e.g. Dummett (1981, p. 408). In fact there is a third possibility, which
is to suppose that Frege has changed his approach to the problem from GLA to
GGA, so that the strong view may still be a legitimate concern. However, I do
not believe this is the case. As we shall see in the remainder of this section, it is
very unclear that Frege indeed endorsed the strong view even in GLA.
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my suggestion about Frege’s relaxed view on the principle of the
complete determination—at least in respect to urelements. This
view, I think, also helps us to clarify Frege’s motivation for the
introduction of extensions of concepts in GLA, as argued as follows.
The initial point that deserves to be highlighted is that in some
passages of Frege’s writings, he actually suggests that value-ranges
play a special role for him in his attempt to reduce arithmetic to
logic. This has been first observed by Ruffino, who recalls an
explicit quote of Frege’s favoured treatment of value-ranges from a
letter to Russell dated July 28, 1902:
I myself was long reluctant to recognize value-ranges and
hence classes; but I saw no other possibility of placing
arithmetic on a logical foundation. But the question is,
how do we apprehend logical objects? And I have found
no other answer to it than this, we apprehend them as
extensions of concepts, or more generally, as value-ranges
of functions. (Frege, 1967b, pp. 140–141)
This passage sheds light on many aspects of GLA. First, it reveals
that (HP) is rejected in the book because, in Frege’s view, only
extensions of concepts can assure the logical nature of the
numbers.35 But why is this so? This is a very interesting piece of
information, since the main argument for the rejection of (HP) in
the book is the problem that it cannot decide whether the Roman
emperor is the number of some concept or not. Therefore, it is
35This was also pointed out by Kemp (2005, p. 196). This interpretation seems
to be incompatible with Frege’s confusing concluding remark in GLA §107: “I
attach no decisive importance even to bringing in the extensions of concepts at
all.” According to Landini (2012), what Frege attaches decisive importance to
in GLA is the fact that two concepts can be put in a one-to-one correspondence:
“The mathematical notion of an “extension,” popular at the time Frege
wrote Grundlagen, was the notion of a class or aggregate of entities. In his
Grundlagen, Frege explicitly petitioned his readers to help themselves to this
familiar mathematical notion of the extension of a concept (a notion we now call
the “logical notion of a class”). He thought this may help in their understanding.
But, he later explains, he attaches no decisive importance to the notion of
extensions in this sense.” (Landini, 2012, p. 115)
Frege’s lack of clarity about extensions of concepts in GLA no doubt suggests
that he was uncertain about it during that period. In fact, Burge (1984) reminds
us of a now lost manuscript from the period immediately after the publication
of GLA where Frege apparently attempted to explain what an extension of a
concept is and considered an alternative contextual definition for the operator
“the number of F s”. Nevertheless, it seems to me that Frege’s early struggle
against extensions of concepts just provides more evidence that supports his
confession to Russell almost two decades later: “And I have found no other
answer to it than this, we apprehend [logical objects] as extensions of concepts
[...]” (Frege, 1967b, p. 140).
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more plausible that the Caesar problem is raised in GLA only as a
matter of establishing without any doubt the nature of numbers as
logical objects. And, since Frege thought that (HP) could not do
so, it was rejected in order to give space for something that, in
principle, could: the explanation of numbers in terms of extensions
of concepts (value-ranges). Moreover, the above passage also points
out that—at least before his acknowledgement of Russell’s
paradox—value-ranges had for Frege a special status as the most
fundamental justification of logical objects.36 That is, logical
objects are apprehended as value-ranges of functions, which, in
turn, are ruled by Axiom V. This, however, is not a mere axiom for
him: it is a fundamental law of logic.
Taking all of this into consideration, one should expect that the
presence of urelements would play a minor role in Frege’s theory,
since what is at stake for him is the construction of mathematical
objects on a logical basis, which is carried out through the notion
of value-ranges. This view also explains his procedure of identifying
truth-values with value-ranges in GGA §10, and not with other
objects: since truth-values and value-ranges are both logical
objects, but the latter are the most basic ones, it goes without
saying that truth-values should be constructed and apprehended by
means of some particular value-ranges. It is also natural to think
that there is no Caesar problem for Frege after numbers are defined
as value-ranges, given the undisputed nature of the latter as logical
objects in his account.
This view on the Caesar problem proves its worth through its
consistence with all of the aspects of GGA relevant to the absence
of urelements that I have been discussing. Together with my
previous considerations, it stresses why Frege claimed to have fixed
the reference of value-range names and thought that this referential
determination could be performed without any mention of
urelements at all, resulting in the restriction of his principle of
complete determination to logical objects. It can be seen, therefore,
that Frege did not fail to solve a “persistent version” of the Caesar
problem in GGA, simply because, according to his standards, there
has never been such problem, nor any sort of indeterminacy of the
notion of value-ranges left.37
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